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PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES IN CIVIL CASES-DOES
Edmonson ALLEVIATE RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
IN THE JURY SELECTION PROCESS?
Edmonson v. Leesvile Concrete Co.,
111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991)
Cynthia L. Eldridge
I. INTRODUCTION
In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,1 the United States Supreme Court ex-
tended the rule in Batson v. Kentucky2 to the civil arena, thereby resolving a con-
flict among the circuit courts of appeals regarding whether a private litigant in a
civil case may use peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors based upon
race.3 Specifically, Edmonson held that: (1) race-based exclusion of potential ju-
rors violates the equal protection rights of those jurors, and (2) the exercise of pe-
remptory challenges by a party in a civil case is pursuant to a course of state
action.4 This note analyzes the Edmonson Court's decision and the questions left
unresolved by that decision.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Thaddeus Donald Edmonson, a thirty-four year-old black construction worker,
was injured in an accident at Fort Polk, Louisiana, when a truck belonging to
Leesville Concrete Company (hereinafter "Leesville") rolled backward and
pinned him against some construction equipment.' Edmonson sued Leesville in
federal district court claiming that a Leesville employee was negligent in allowing
the truck to roll backward.8
Edmonson used all three of his peremptory challenges to strike white members
from the venire, with no objection from opposing counsel.' Edmonson, however,
objected when Leesville used two of its peremptory challenges to strike two pro-
spective black jurors.8 Citing Batson,9 Edmonson asked the district court judge to
require Leesville to articulate a race-neutral reason for using its peremptories in
this manner." The court refused to require any explanation from Leesville, rea-
l. Ill S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
2. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
3. Batson requires a prosecutor, upon primafacie showing of racially discriminatory selection of venire by
the defendant, to articulate a racially neutral reason for using a peremptory challenge. Id. at 97.
4. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2082, 2087.
5. Id. at 2080.
6. Id.
7. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 1308, 1310 (5th Cir. 1989).
8. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2081.
9. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
10. 860 F.2d at 1310.
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soning that Batson did not apply in a civil setting."1 The jury, composed of eleven
white members and one black member, rendered a verdict for the plaintiff, mea-
suring his total damages at $90,000.12 Because the jury found Edmonson to be
eighty percent contributorily negligent, the award was reduced to $18,000.13
Edmonson appealed the verdict and sought a new trial on the ground that Lees-
ville exercised its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner.14 A
panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "[riacial prejudice has no
more place in the federal courtroom on the days the court is conducting a civil trial
than it does on the days when the same judge, seated at the same bench, in the
same courtroom, is conducting a criminal trial."1" The Fifth Circuit remanded the
case for the district court to decide whether Edmonson had established aprimafa-
cie case of racial discrimination; if so, Leesville must be given an opportunity to
articulate a race-neutral reason for its action.16
On rehearing en banc," a divided panel affirmed the district court, providing
two reasons:
[Tihe mechanical one, that state action is not present in [a civil action between pri-
vate litigants]; and the logical one, that striking a venireman in a civil case because
you fear he may tend to favor your opponent over you neither demeans him nor calls
in question the fairness of the civil justice system. 8
The court stated that a civil litigant may exercise peremptory challenges "for any
reason, for no reason, or even for a bad reason .... "19 Regardless of the man-
ner in which a party exercises peremptory challenges, the state is not accountable






15. Id. at 1313-14.
16. Id. at 1315.
17. Id. at 1317.
18. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 219 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
19. Id. at 226.
20. Id.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the circuits re-
garding whether the use of peremptory challenges by a private litigant in a civil
case constitutes state action.21
III. HISTORY AND LAW
A. Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection
1. The Early Cases
One of the first cases to reach the Supreme Court involving racial discrimina-
tion in the jury selection process was Strauder v. West Virginia. 22 The defendant in
Strauder was a black man convicted of murder by a jury composed exclusively of
white males.23 Strauder contested a West Virginia statute which prescribed that
only white males were eligible to serve as members of grand or petit juries.24 The
Court held that the West Virginia statute denied black defendants the equal protec-
tion of the laws.25 The Court reasoned that the very purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was "to assure the colored race the enjoyment of all the civil rights
that under the law are enjoyed by white persons . ".. 26
Thus, Strauder guaranteed that black males would have the possibility of serv-
ing on grand and petit juries and could not be prevented by statute from such ser-
vice.27 "Prosecutors, however, quickly found a way to subvert the Strauder
decision by using their peremptory challenges to remove from the jury the blacks
who could no longer be statutorily excluded."28
In 1965, the Supreme Court first confronted the use of peremptory challenges
by a state prosecutor to dismiss blacks from the venire in Swain v. State of Ala-
bama. 2 Swain was convicted of rape and sentenced to death3" by an all-white jury
21. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., I I I S. Ct. 41 (1990). See Dunham v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts,
Inc., 919 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1990) (a private litigant may not exercise peremptory strikes to remove potential
jurors from the venire because of race), cert. denied, I11 S. Ct. 2797 (1991); Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822
(1 1th Cir. 1989) (Batson applies in civil as well as criminal cases); Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890
(D. Conn. 1986) (in three civil rights actions against city, assistant city attorney may not use peremptory chal-
lenges to strike all black citizens from venires unless a satisfactory race-neutral reason can be articulated for each
strike). Cf Dias v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 919 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1990) (corporation may not assert an objection pur-
suant to Batson in a civil trial where plaintiff exercised peremptory challenges allegedly based on gender), cert.
denied, I 1 I S. Ct. 2791 (1991); United States v. DeGross, 913 F2d 1417 (1990) (government has standing to
assert equal protection rights of potential jurors sought to be excluded by defendant who exercised peremptory
challenges discriminating on the basis of gender), affdon reh g en banc, 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992); Reynolds
v. City of Little Rock, 893 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1990) (Batson applies to the actions of a government litigant in a
civil trial).
22. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
23. Id. at 304.
24. Id. at 305.
25. Id. at 308.
26. Id. at 306.
27. Id. at 312.
28. Marc D. Fisher, Note, The Application of Batson v. Kentucky in a Civil Trial Setting, 42 BAYLOR L. REV.
173, 176 (1990).
29. 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
30. Id. at 203.
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in Talladega County, Alabama."1 The prosecutor, exercising peremptory chal-
lenges, struck the only six blacks on the venire panel.32 Swain's motion seeking to
void the chosen petit jury because of "invidious discrimination in the selection of
jurors" was denied.33
The Court upheld Swain's conviction on the ground that the defendant had not
established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by the prosecutor. 3
Even though no black person had served on a petit jury in Talladega County since
1950, 3 the defendant nevertheless had the burden of proving that the reason for
this exclusion from jury service was "the prosecutor's systematic use of peremp-
tory challenges against Negroes over a period of time. 38 Thus, a prosecutor was
free to exercise peremptory challenges in a given case in any manner, even a dis-
criminatory manner, because of "[tihe presumption in any particular case
that the prosecutor is using the State's challenges to obtain a fair and impar-
tial jury to try the case before the Court."37
But when the prosecutor in a county, in case after case, whatever the circumstances,
whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is responsible
for the removal of Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors by the jury
commissioners and who have survived challenges for cause, with the result that no
Negroes ever serve on petit juries, the Fourteenth Amendment claim takes on added
significance.38
2. Batson v. Kentucky
The burden on criminal defendants under Swain was virtually insurmountable.
This "crippling burden of proof' 39 which insured that prosecutors' peremptory
challenges would remain "largely immune from constitutional scrutiny"" was di-
minished in Batson v. Kentucky. 4 Batson, a black man, was convicted of second-
degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods by a jury composed only of whites. 42
The defendant moved to discharge the jury before it was sworn on the ground that
the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges-to strike all four black persons
from the venire-violated the defendant's rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth
31. Id. at 205.
32. Id. at 210.
33. Id. at 203.
34. Id. at 226.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 227.
37. Id. at 222.
38. Id. at 223.
39. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92 (1986).
40. Id. at 92-93.
41. Id. at 79.
42. Id. at 83.
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Amendments. ' The trial judge denied the defendant's motion, reasoning that par-
ties could exercise "peremptory challenges to 'strike anybody they want to.' ""
The Batson Court rejected the evidentiary formulation of Swain and substituted
a burden of proof which allowed a defendant to show racial discrimination in the
selection of the venire "by relying solely on the facts concerning its selection in his
case."4 A primafacie case has three requirements:
(1) the defendant must show that he is a member of a "cognizable racial group" and
that the prosecutor has utilized peremptory challenges to remove members of
this group from the venire;6
(2) the defendant may then assume that the prosecutor has exercised these challenges
in a discriminatory manner because "peremptory challenges constitute ajury se-
lection practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discrimi-
nate' ,;47 and
(3) the defendant must demonstrate that the available facts and "any other relevant
circumstances raise an inference" that the prosecutor exercised the peremptories
to exclude the potential jurors because of their race. 4
After the defendant establishes aprimafacie case, the burden shifts to the prose-
cutor to come forward with a racially-neutral explanation for challenging the black
jurors. 9 While the explanation "need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a
challenge for cause,"" the Batson Court held that the prosecutor will no longer be
allowed to merely state that the challenges were exercised based on the assumption
that the potential jurors "would be partial to the defendant because of their shared
race."
51
Just as the Equal Protection Clause forbids the States to exclude black persons from
the venire on the assumption that blacks as a group are unqualified to serve as jurors,
...so it forbids the States to strike black veniremen on the assumption that they
will be biased in a particular case simply because the defendant is black.5 2
Thus, according to Batson, the prosecutor must offer a reason for exercising pe-
remptory challenges to exclude prospective black jurors; this reason must not be a
mere denial of discriminatory intent, and it must be "related to the particular case
to be tried."5" The trial judge then must determine whether the defendant has es-
tablished purposeful discrimination.' 4
43. Id.
44. Id. (quoting the trial judge).
45. Id. at 95.
46. Id. at 96.
47. Id. (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
48. Id.
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3. The Aftermath of Batson
Recent cases evince attempts to relax the showing needed to establish a prima
facie case of racial discrimination in the selection of the venire. In Holland v. Illi-
nois,"5 Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, denounced the requirement of
Batson that a defendant must be of the same race as the excluded juror, reasoning
that there is "no obvious reason to conclude that a defendant's race should deprive
him of standing in his own trial to vindicate his own jurors' right to sit." 6 A major-
ity of the Court adopted Justice Kennedy's viewpoint in Powers v. Ohio,57 holding
that "a criminal defendant may object to race-based exclusions of jurors effected
through peremptory challenges whether or not the defendant and the excluded ju-
ror share the same race."58
Powers, a white man, convicted of murder, aggravated murder and attempted
aggravated murder was sentenced to imprisonment for fifty-three years to life.59
During the jury selection process, Powers objected to the prosecutor's use of pe-
remptory challenges to strike seven blacks from the venire.6" As each peremptory
challenge was used, Powers cited Batson and asked the court to require the prose-
cutor to articulate a racially neutral reason for exercising the challenge; the trial
court denied each of these requests and excused the potential jurors .61 Powers ap-
pealed his conviction to the Ohio Court of Appeals claiming that the prosecutor's
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges violated his equal protection rights. 2
Powers' conviction was affirmed. 6
The Court's holding in Powers was based on the violation of potential jurors'
equal protection rights and the defendant's equal protection rights. 64 The Court
reasoned that "racial discrimination in the selection of jurors 'casts doubt on the
integrity of the judicial process,' . . . and places the fairness of a criminal pro-
ceeding in doubt. 65 Thus, the harm caused is not always a violation of the defend-
ant's individual rights, but an assault on the integrity of the judicial process. 6 The
defendant, however, does suffer a "real injury" from the prosecutor's discrimina-
55. 110 S. Ct. 803 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 812.
57. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).




62. Id. Powers also claimed that the purported discrimination violated (1) the Sixth Amendment's guarantee
of a fair cross section in the jury, and (2) OHIo CONST. art. I, §§ 10, 16. Id.
63. Id. The court of appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed the appeal because "it pre-
sented no substantial constitutional question." Id. at 1366-67.
64. Id. at 1370-71. The Court also addressed the issue of third-party standing, i.e., whether the defendant had
standing to object to equal protection violations of potential jurors. Id. at 1371. See infra note 67 and accompany-
ing text.
65. Id. at 1371 (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979)).
66. Id.
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tion, because if "[t]he composition of the trier of fact itself is called in question,
. . . the irregularity may pervade all the proceedings that follow." 7
Nonetheless, the harm to the excluded jurors is much greater: "A venireperson
excluded from jury service because of race suffers a profound personal humilia-
tion heightened by its public character. The rejected juror may lose confidence in
the court and its verdicts .... "68 Moreover, the Court noted that even though an
individual excluded from jury service on account of race has the legal right to sue
on his or her own behalf, such a suit is very rarely brought:69 "The barriers to a suit
by an excluded juror are daunting."7 Such persons may not object at the time of
exclusion or even know why they are being excluded; also, practical barriers such
as the "small financial stake involved and the economic burdens of litigation" tend
to discourage separate suits by excluded jurors .71
Finally, in Hernandez v. New York, 72 Justice Kennedy elaborated upon the type
of race-neutral explanation sufficient to meet constitutional standards. Hernandez
fired several shots on a Brooklyn street injuring three people.73 Hernandez raised
a Batson objection when the prosecutor used four peremptory challenges to re-
move Latinos from the venire.74 Before the Court could rule on whether Hernan-
dez had established aprimafacie case of discrimination, the prosecutor offered his
reasons for exercising the strikes.7" The prosecutor revealed that he doubted the
ability of the excused Latino jurors to "be able to listen and follow the inter-
preter."76 Instead, the prosecutor believed the jurors would have listened directly
to the testimony of Spanish-speaking witnesses.77 The prosecutor further ex-
plained that he would have no reason to exclude Latinos simply because of their
ethnicity because the victims in the case were Latino and all of the prosecutor's
67. Id. at 1372. Three important criteria must be met for a litigant to have standing to bring an action on behalf
of a third party: (1) the litigant must have suffered an "injury-in-fact" which gives that litigant an interest in the
outcome of the suit; (2) the litigant must have a sufficiently close relation to the third party; and (3) the third party
must be hindered in some way from protecting his or her own rights. Id. at 1370-71.
68. Id. at 1372.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1373.
71. Id. See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2356 n.8 (1992) (citation omitted) (noting that
potential jurors are often excused from service without knowing which party excused them, "thus enhancing the
perception that it is the court that has rejected them").
72. 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991). Kennedy, J., announced the judgment of the Court in which Rehnquist, C.J., and
White and Souter, JJ., joined. O'Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Scalia, J.,
joined. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J.,
joined. Id. at 1863-64.
73. Id. at 1864.
74. Id. The defendant did not press the Batson claim regarding the excusal of two potential jurors, both of
whom had brothers who had been convicted of crimes. Id. Furthermore, one of the persons excused was being
prosecuted by the same District Attorney's office representing the State in the present case. Id.
75. Id. This voluntary explanation by the prosecutor "could be taken as evidence of the prosecutor's sincerity."
Id. at 1872.
76. Id. at 1864.
77. Id. at 1864-65.
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civilian witnesses were Latino.78 The trial court found the prosecutor's explana-
tion sufficiently race-neutral. 7 9
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Hernandez, reasoning that the
prosecutor lacked the requisite discriminatory intent: "Unless a discriminatory in-
tent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed
race neutral."8 Even if the prosecutor's actions would have a disparate impact on a
certain group of jurors, unless the prosecutor "adopted a criterion with the intent
of causing the impact asserted, that impact itself does not violate the principle -of
race-neutrality."81 Because intent to discriminate is a finding of fact given great
deference on appeal,82 the conviction of Hernandez was affirmed as there was "no
clear error in the state trial court's determination that the prosecutor did not dis-
criminate on the basis of the ethnicity of Latino jurors."83
Concurring, Justice O'Connor agreed, but suggested that the opinion went too
far by advocating that "disproportionate effect might be sufficient for an equal pro-
tection violation in the use of peremptory strikes . . . . "I Such an effect ignores
the requirement of intentional discrimination."5 Absent discriminatory intent, the
prosecutor may exercise peremptory challenges "for any reason, or no reason at
all."8
B. What Constitutes State Action ?
Despite a large body of decided cases, "state action" remains an elusive con-
cept. While it is relatively clear that persons employed by a government - whether
local, state or federal - are state actors, 87 it is "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing
circumstances [that] .. .the non-obvious involvement of the State in private
conduct [may] be attributed its true significance."' The amorphous nature of state
action analysis may be, at least in part, the reason that the Court has found state
action where such action appears to be private, 89 and failed to find state action in
cases permeated with involvement by the state.9"
78. Id. at 1865.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1866.
81. Id. at 1867. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (holding that "[d]isproportionate
impact ... is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution").
82. Id. at 1868-69 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98).
83. Id. at 1871.
84. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1874 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. But see Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) ("a public defender does not act under color of
state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding").
88. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
89. See, e.g., id. at 721; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
90. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Polk County, 454 U.S. at 312; Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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1. State Action in Racial Discrimination
In Shelley v. Kraemer,"1 the United States Supreme Court held that judicial en-
forcement of private racially discriminatory restrictive covenants constituted state
action which denied the petitioners the equal protection of the laws.2 The cove-
nants restricted the sale of certain property, providing that for fifty years certain
lots could not be owned or occupied by "people of the Negro or Mongolian
Race."93 Several owners of property subject to the covenants brought suit to enjoin
the Shelleys, a black family, from taking possession of property in the same neigh-
borhood and subject to the covenants. 4 The Court held that the restrictive cove-
nants - and voluntary adherence to the terms of those covenants - could not be
considered a violation of any rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment be-
cause "lt]hat Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, how-
ever discriminatory or wrongful." 5 When the owners of the nearby property
sought an injunction in state court, however, the power of the state was invoked to
perpetuate the discrimination. 6
It is clear that but for the active intervention of the state courts, supported by the full
panoply of state power, petitioners would have been free to occupy the properties in
question without restraint.
9 7
Thus, purely private discrimination became a violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment when the state court was enlisted to enforce the discrimination. 8 The Shelley
Court stated that "[t]he Constitution confers upon no individual the right to de-
mand action by the State which results in the denial of equal protection of the laws
to other individuals."99
Thirteen years later, in the early days of the civil rights movement, the Court
held in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authorityl°0 that a restaurant, as the lessee of
public property, is prohibited from refusing service to any individual because of
race.10 1 The restaurant, Eagle Coffee Shop, entered into a twenty-year lease 0 2
with the Wilmington Parking Authority, an agency of the State of Delaware. 0 3
91. 334 U.S. 1(1948).
92. Id. at 20.
93. Id. at5.
94. Id. at6.
95. Id. at 13.
96. Id. at 18.
97. Id. at 19.
98. Id. at 20.
99. Id. at 22. Shelley v. Kraemer has been criticized for its reasoning. Even though many agree with the result
in the case, "such reasoning, consistently applied, would require individuals to conform their private agreements
to constitutional standards whenever, as almost always, the individuals might later seek the security of potential
judicial enforcement." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18-2, at 1697 (2d ed. 1988)
[hereinafter TRIBE]. See also Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L.
REV. 1, 29-31 (1959).
100. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
101. Id. at 726.
102. Id. at 719.
103. Id. at 716.
1992]
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There was no requirement in the lease that the restaurant provide services to the
general public on a nondiscriminatory basis.104 Even though the decision to dis-
criminate was made by a private party, the Court held that:
By its inaction, the Authority, and through it the State, has not only made itself a
party to the refusal of service, but has elected to place its power, property and pres-
tige behind the admitted discrimination."0 "
Because the Parking Authority relied upon revenue from Eagle to remain open,
the Court recognized the Authority as a "joint participant in the challenged activ-
ity,"106 and held that such joint participation brought the discriminatory activity
under the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment.107
The next significant state action case arose eleven years after Burton in Moose
Lodge v. Irvis,1 8 where the Court applied a "nexus" test,1"9 rather than a "joint
action" test. 1 0 A Negro guest of a member of the Moose Lodge was refused ser-
vice solely because of his race.111 Irvis brought suit against the Lodge and the
Pennsylvania Liquor Authority (hereinafter "the Authority") -a state agency
which issues licenses authorizing the sale of alcoholic beverages and heavily regu-
lates the holders of such licenses. 12 One of the Authority's regulations required
club licensees to adhere to the provisions of their club's constitution and bylaws. 3
Thus, because the Moose Lodge advocated racial discrimination in its constitu-
tion, the Authority's regulation required the MooseLodge to discriminate in order
to maintain its liquor license. 114
The Court held that the involvement of the state was not significant enough to
find state action in the Moose Lodge's discriminatory practice.115 "However de-
tailed this type of regulation may be in some particulars, it cannot be said to in any
way foster or encourage racial discrimination."116 The Court did, however, con-
cede that Irvis was entitled to a decree enjoining enforcement of the regulation re-
quiring compliance by the Lodge with provisions of its constitution and bylaws. 17
Justice Brennan, in dissent, disagreed with the majority's reasoning and its
remedy: "[S]omething is uniquely amiss in a society where the government, the
104. Id. at 720.
105. Id. at 725 (emphasis added).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
109. Id. at 176.
110. See supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
111. Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 165.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 177.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 175.
116. Id. at 176-77. The Court also noted that the State could not be considered a "partner" or a "joint venturer"
with the club. Id. at 177. The Court held that the regulatory scheme did not "sufficiently implicate the State in the
discriminatory guest policies of the Moose Lodge" so as to make the actions of the Moose Lodge state action. Id.
117. Id. at 179.
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authoritative oracle of community values, involves itself in racial discrimina-
tion." '18 Because of the pervasive regulatory scheme involved "under which the
State dictates and continually supervises virtually every detail of the operation of
the licensee's business," Justice Brennan would have found state action.119
2. Other State Action Decisions
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. ,12 the Court was faced with action by a
private utility company which allegedly violated the petitioner's due process
rights. The Court had to decide whether to apply the "joint action" test from Bur-
ton121 or the "nexus" test from Moose Lodge. 122
Jackson filed suit alleging that Metropolitan should not have disconnected elec-
trical service to her residence until she was given notice, a hearing, and an oppor-
tunity to pay any overdue amounts. 23 Metropolitan held a certificate from the
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission giving it the right to deliver electricity to
a particular service area; therefore, to keep the certificate, and thus the ability to
operate, Metropolitan was subject to very broad regulation by the Commission.124
Furthermore, Metropolitan was the only electric utility providing service to York,
Pennsylvania, the petitioner's place of residence."12
The Court held that termination of service without notice was not state action:
[Metropolitan's] exercise of the choice allowed by state law where the initiative
comes from it and not from the State, does not make its action in doing so "state
action" for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
126
The Court reasoned that while Metropolitan's termination procedures had to be
filed with the Commission, such procedures "became effective 60 days after filing
when not disapproved by the Commission. "127 This lack of action by the Commis-
sion did not amount to the specific authorization and approval necessary to consti-
tute state action.
128
118. Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 185 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,
190-91 (1970)).
119. Id. Justice Brennan's dissent was joined by Justice Marshall. Id. at 184. Justice Douglas wrote a separate
dissent, also joined by Justice Marshall, finding that a liquor license in Pennsylvania is a scarce commodity, espe-
cially in Harrisburg, the site of this case, where the quota for such licenses had been full for many years. Id. at
182. Thus, the State put "the weight of its liquor license, concededly a valued and important adjunct to a private
club, behind racial discrimination." Id. at 183.
120. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
121. See supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 108-18 and accompanying text. The Court in Jackson describes these tests as whether the
case "should fall on the Burton side of the [state action] line ... rather than the Moose Lodge side of that line."
Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351.
123. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 347.
124. Id. at 346.
125. Id. at 351.
126. Id. at 357.
127. Id. at 355 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 354.
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The Court applied the "nexus" test from Moose Lodge'29 rather than the "joint
action" test from Burton. 130 Justice Douglas, in dissent, criticized the majority for
evaluating each facet of state involvement singularly rather than studying the "ag-
gregate of all relevant factors .... "131
Blum v. Yaretsky'32 is another case in which the Court failed to find state action
in an industry permeated with state and federal regulations. 133 In Blum, a class of
Medicaid patients challenged the ability of the nursing homes where they resided
to discharge or transfer patients with no notice or opportunity for a hearing. 134 In
order to continue receiving Medicaid payments, a nursing home facility was re-
quired to insure that each patient received the care appropriate to that patient's
needs, no more and no less."'
Even though "the State is obliged to approve or disapprove continued payment
of Medicaid benefits after a change in the patient's need for services,"13 the Court
held that the State was not responsible, initially, for making the change. 137 The
Court reasoned that while a physician on the evaluating committee was required to
complete the forms, the ultimate decision concerning the transfer of the patient
rested with that physician rather than being mandated by the score on the form. 131
Adopting the rationale of Jackson,13 the Blum Court held that "[m]ere approval of
or acquiescence in the initiatives of a private party is not sufficient to justify hold-
ing the State responsible for those initiatives under the terms of the Fourteenth
Amendment."14
The state action inquiry was no easier for the Court -even though an employee
of the State was the actor -in Polk County v. Dodson.' ' In Polk County, an Iowa
prisoner claimed'42 that he was denied due process of law when his defense coun-
129. See supra notes 108-18 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text. See also Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351.
131. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 360 n.2 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Burton, 365 U.S. at 724). Justice Douglas
would have applied the "joint action" test from Burton, taking into account the aggregate of factors, to find state
action. Id. at 360 n.2. The majority ignored the following language from Burton: "By its inaction, the Authority,
and through it the State, has not only made itself a party to the refusal of service, but has elected to place its
power, property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination." Burton, 365 U.S. at 725 (emphasis added).
132. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
133. Id. at 998.
134. Id. at 993. Federal regulations require that a committee of physicians be established to assess periodically
whether a patient is receiving the appropriate level of care. Id. at 994-95. To facilitate the committee's evalua-
tions, the State requires that certain forms be used; based on criteria established by the State, if a patient receives
a given score, he may be transferred to a facility providing a lower or higher level of care, whichever the case may
be. Id. at 1006.
135. Id. at 1006.
136. Id. at 1010.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 419 U.S. 345 (1974). See supra notes 120-31 and accompanying text.
140.457 U.S. at 1004-05.
141. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
142. Dodson also claimed that defense counsel's motion to withdraw effectively deprived him of his right to
counsel and subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 315. In addition, Dodson asserted state claims
for malpractice and breach of an oral promise by his defense counsel to prosecute the appeal. Id. at 315 n.3.
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sel, an employee of the county who had been appointed to represent his appeal,
sought and was granted permission to withdraw from Dodson's case on the ground
that the defendant's claims were "wholly frivolous."" Rather than admitting the
obvious -that a public defender, as an employee of the State, acts under color of
law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983-the Court held that this particular employee
was only performing the normal adversarial functions required of any attorney.44
The Court dismissed the employment relationship as only a "relevant factor" in de-
termining whether a state employee acts under color of law.
145
The Court did not hold, however, that a public defender was never to be consid-
ered a state actor, especially if "performing certain administrative and possibly in-
vestigative functions.""4 The Court refused to elaborate on this point, holding
"only that a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing
a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceed-
ing. "147
3. Garnishment and Attachment Cases
In a line of cases beginning with Sniadach v. Family Financial Corp. , , the
Court found state action where a government official participated, with a creditor,
in the deprivation of a debtor's property. 149 In Sniadach, the Court held, without
discussing state action, that a statute allowing prejudgment garnishment of wages,
with no prior notice to the garnishee, violated the procedural due process require-
ment of the Fourteenth Amendment. '50
Similarly, in Fuentes v. Shevin,"5 the Court invalidated statutes in Florida and
Pennsylvania which allowed a person's possessions to be seized, upon the issuance
of a writ of replevin by a state agent, "simply upon the ex parte application of any
other person who claims a right to them and posts a security bond."" 2 Neither of
the statutes required prior notice to the debtor or a hearing before the seizure of the
143. Id. at 314-15. Dodson brought the action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that the public defender acted
under color of law to deprive him of certain constitutional rights. Id. at 314. In a recent decision, the Court noted
that the inquiries in a section 1983 action and a state action case are the same. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct.
2348, 2356 n.9 (1992) (citing Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982)).
144. Id. at 320. Had the Court reached the case on its merits, the Court could have remanded the case for the
district court to find that the public defender's actions did not deprive Dodson of any constitutionally protected
rights. See, e.g., Polk County, 454 U.S. at 337-38 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing the availability of the
affirmative defense of qualified immunity to protect public defenders from suits by dissatisfied clients).
145. Polk County, 454 U.S. at 321.
146. Id. at 325.
147. Id.
148. 395 U.S. 337 (1960). See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 607 (1975)
(invalidating a statute allowing a writ of garnishment to be issued, thus depriving a debtor of property without
notice or an opportunity to be heard); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (invalidating statutes allowing sei-
zure of property by a writ of replevin without prior notice to the debtor); see also infra notes 151-55 and accom-
panying text.
149. 395 U.S. at 341-42.
150. Id.
151. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
152. Id. at 69-70.
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property.15 The property in Shevin was seized by a creditor claiming that the de-
fendant was in default of contractual obligations to pay for the goods. "4 The Court,
without discussing the state action doctrine, found that such a taking was a viola-
tion of due process regardless of whether the creditor's claims were true: "[E]ven
assuming that the appellants had fallen behind in their installment payments, and
that they had no other valid defenses, that is immaterial here. The right to be heard
does not depend upon an advance showing that one will surely prevail at the hear-
ing."155
The final cases concerning the state action doctrine involve the prejudgment at-
tachment of a debtor's property by the creditor. If a creditor acts pursuant to state
law - but without the aid of local government officials - to take possession of an-
other's property, the Court has described this procedure as a private, self-help
remedy involving no state action. 156 On the other hand, if a private individual en-
lists the aid of a state court clerk to issue a writ of attachment, which is then exe-
cuted by the county sheriff to attach a debtor's property, the action becomes that of
the State.
1 7
In Flagg Bros. v. Brooks,5 8 Brooks and her family were evicted from their
apartment, at which time the city marshal arranged for their possessions to be
stored by Flagg Brothers in its warehouse."5 9 Brooks could not pay the storage fee
and was notified by Flagg Brothers that her possessions would be sold if the fee
was not paid within ten days. 6 ' Brooks brought suit seeking an injunction to pre-
vent the sale of her family's possessions and alleging that such a sale would violate
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 161
To prevail, Brooks was required to "establish not only that Flagg Brothers acted
under color of the challenged statute, but also that its actions [were] properly at-
tributable to the State of New York."' 62 The Court held that the action taken by
Flagg Brothers could not be attributed to the State because the State did not com-
pel the action but merely allowed it in the form of the challenged statute. 
163
153. Id. at 75.
154. Id. at 70.
155. Id. at 87.
156. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 161 n. 11 (1978). See infra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
157. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,924 (1982). See infra notes 168-76 and accompanying text.
158. 436 U.S. 149 (1982).
159. Id. at 153.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 156.
163. Id. at 164. See Henry C. Strickland, The State Action Doctrine and the Rehnquist Court, 18 HASTINGS
CoNsT. L.Q. 587 (1991) [hereinafter Strickland] far a discussion of Chief Justice Rehnquist's view of state
action. Strickland advocates that "Chief Justice Rehnquist appears to use the term 'state action' to refer not to an
act done by or attributable to the state, but to an act done by or attributable to the state that unconstitutionally
deprives an individual of life, liberty, property, or equal protection of the laws." Id. at 616 n. 151.
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The Court stated that "[t]his Court ...has never held that a State's mere ac-
quiescence in a private action converts that action into that of the State." 16 The
Court distinguished the Sniadach65 line of cases reasoning that the State of New
York had not ordered the surrender of any property: "It has merely enacted a stat-
ute which provides that a warehouseman conforming to the provisions of the stat-
ute may convert his traditional lien into good title." '"6
The Court established a two-part test 167 to determine whether action by a pri-
vate party may be attributed to the State in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.'18 Lugar
was the lessee-operator of a truck stop who was indebted to his supplier, Edmond-
son.' 69 Edmondson sued on this debt and sought prejudgment attachment of cer-
tain properties owned by Lugar. 7 ' After Edmondson alleged, in a petition, a
belief that Lugar might dispose of his property in order to defeat this creditor, a
writ of attachment was issued by a clerk of the state court and then executed by the
sheriff. 171 Lugar, in a subsequent suit, brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging that Edmondson had acted with the State to deprive him of his property
without due process of law.'72
Enunciating and applying the following test, the Court held that the state statute
was "procedurally defective under the Fourteenth Amendment": 73
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege cre-
ated by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for
whom the State is responsible .... Second, the party charged with the depriva-
tion must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. This may be because
he is a state official, because he has acted together with or has obtained significant
164. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 164. This statement ignores the holding in Burton which held the State responsi-
ble for the inaction of the Wilmington Parking Authority in failing to prevent discrimination by a private restau-
rant. Burton, 365 U.S. at 725. Burton, however, involved overt racial discrimination, an equal protection issue.
See supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text. Flagg Bros., on the other hand, involved an alleged denial of pro-
cedural due process. See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
166. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 161 n. 11. Justice Stevens, in dissent, found the reasoning of the majority to be an
.unwise expansion of the state-action doctrine." Id. at 174 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Because the majority distin-
guished the Sniadach line of cases due to some overt official involvement by an employee of the State, Justice
Stevens' concern was that state action might be found in "purely ministerial acts of'minor governmental function-
aries' ..... "Id. at 173-74 (citing cases). Justice Stevens summarized this argument: "If it is unconstitutional
for a State to allow a private party to exercise a traditional state power because the state supervision of that power
is purely mechanical, the State surely cannot immunize its actions from constitutional scrutiny by removing even
the mechanical supervision." Id. at 175.
167. See infra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
168. 457 U.S. 922 (1982). Citing the previous tests applied by the Supreme Court, the Lugar Court stated:
"Whether these different tests are actually different in operation or simply different ways of characterizing the
necessarily fact-bound inquiry that confronts the Court in such a situation need not be resolved here." Id. at 939.
169. Id. at 924.
170. Id.
171. Id. The attachment was later dismissed because Edmondson failed to establish the grounds required by
statute which were alleged in the petition. Id. at 925.
172. Id. at 925.
173. Id. at 941.
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aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the
State. 174
Thus, the private party became a state actor when he acted jointly with state
officials, pursuant to the statute, to secure attachment of Lugar's property without
notice or a hearing.17 ' Because the procedure was state-created and because Ed-
mondson was a joint participant with the State when he used the procedure, the
Court found that the conduct was state action for constitutional purposes. 171
IV. THE PRESENT CASE
Justice Kennedy authored the majority opinion in Ednonson v. Leesvile Con-
crete Co., 177 holding that when a private litigant exercises peremptory challenges
to exclude jurors based solely on race, such exclusion violates the equal protection
rights of the challenged jurors. 178 The Court noted that while past racial discrimi-
nation decisions dealt with discrimination by government officials in criminal
proceedings, such decisions never "intimated that race discrimination [was] per-
missible in civil proceedings.""" The Court granted certiorari to resolve the dis-
pute among the circuit courts of appeals regarding whether the holding in Batson v.
Kentucky18 applied to the exercise of peremptory challenges in civil cases. 181
The Court applied the two-part test from Lugar182 to determine whether dis-
crimination by a private litigant may be fairly attributed to the State. 183 The first
part of the test is "whether the claimed constitutional deprivation resulted from the
exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state authority."1 84 The second
part of the test is "whether the private party charged with the deprivation could be
described in all fairness as a state actor."
185
174. Id. at 937.
175. Id. at 942.
176. Id. A dissenting opinion in Lugar questioned the finding that Edmondson became a state actor because of
joint participation with state officials as Edmondson did "no more than invoke a presumptively valid judicial
process in pursuit only of legitimate private ends." Id. at 948 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J. and
O'Connor, J.). The dissenters advocated that if Lugar was objecting to the constitutionality of the state statute, he
should have sued the State or those employees of the State who acted to deprive Lugar of his property. Id. at 946.
In a separate dissent, Chief Justice Burger reasoned that "[iunvoking the judicial process ...does not transform
essentially private conduct into actions of the State." Id. at 943.
Justice White, witing for the majority, tried to dispel the concerns of the dissenters regarding a private party's
invocation of presumptively valid legal procedures by stating that "[t]he holding today ...is limited to the par-
ticular context of prejudgment attachment."Id. at 939 n.21. This prophecy proved untrue. The majority opinion
in Edmonson relies heavily on the state action test set forth in Lugar. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
111 S. Ct. 2077, 2082-84 (1991); inf0 notes 183-97 and accompanying text.
177. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
178. Id. at 2080. Justice Kennedy was joined in the majority opinion by Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun,
Stevens and Souter. Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia. Justice Scalia also filed a separate dissenting opinion.
179. Id. at 2082.
180. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). See supra notes 39-54 and accompanying text.
181. Edmnonson, Ill S. Ct. at 2081.
182. See supra notes 168-76 and accompanying text.
183. Edmnnson, Ill S. Ct. at 2082.
184. Id. at 2082-83 (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939-41 (1982)).
185. Id. at 2083 (citing Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941-42).
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The Court quickly dispensed with any question concerning the first part of the
test by citing the federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1870, which governs the number and
use of peremptory challenges.186 Without this authorization from Congress, Lees-
ville could not have engaged in the alleged discrimination by exercising the chal-
lenges. 1 7 Furthermore, "[bly their very nature, peremptory challenges have no
significance outside a court of law."188 After disposing of the source of the pe-
remptory challenge, the Court addressed the issue of whether a private litigant be-
comes a state actor in this context.
189
The Court set forth three elements to consider in determining whether a private
person becomes a state actor for constitutional purposes when exercising peremp-
tory challenges:190
(1) "the extent to which the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits";1 9
(2) "whether the actor is performing a traditional governmental function"; 92 and
(3) "whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of gov-
ernmental authority."
193
Justice Kennedy reasoned that the first element was satisfied for "without the
overt, significant participation of the government, the peremptory challenge sys-
tem, as well as the jury trial system of which it is a part, simply could not exist."94
Justice Kennedy focused on the entire process of jury selection, from locating and
summoning the jury from voter lists, to the completion ofjury qualification forms
by prospective jurors. 195 The Court also addressed the role of the trial judge in voir
dire -often conducted exclusively by the judge -and the judge's role in deciding
how peremptory challenges will be allocated among the parties. 196 Because the
government created the legal framework regarding the use of peremptory chal-
lenges, the government has involved itself "in a significant way ...with invidi-
ous discrimination."197
Justice O'Connor, in dissent, faulted the majority for focusing on the selection
and impaneling of the jury: "All of this activity, as well as the trial judge's control
186. Id. at 2083. The relevant portion of the statute provides that:
In civil cases, each party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges. Several defendants or several
plaintiffs may be considered as a single party for the purposes of making challenges, or the court may
allow additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly.
28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1982).
187. Edmonson, Ill S. Ct. at 2083.
188. Id. The Court stated that the "sole purpose [of peremptory challenges] is to permit litigants to assist the
government in the selection of an impartial trier of fact." Id.
189. See id. at 2083-87.
190. Id. at 2083.
191. Id. (citing Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988); Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961)).
192. Id. (citing Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)).
193. Id. (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)).
194. Id. at 2084.
195. Id. These qualification forms are relied on by counsel when exercising peremptory strikes. Id.
196. Id. at 2084.
197. Id. at 2085 (citation omitted).
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over voir dire, . . . are merely prerequisites to the use of a peremptory challenge;
they do not constitute participation in the challenge." 198 Justice O'Connor noted
that, in fact, the only actual participation of the government in the peremptory
process is when "the judge advises the juror [that] he or she has been excused." 9'
Such action, according to the dissent, is not sufficient to warrant holding the gov-
ernment responsible for the action of private litigants. 200
The second element of the state actor test developed by the majority"' is
whether the action performed by the private individual is a traditional function of
government.2"2 The majority reasoned that the peremptory challenge is used to se-
lect the jury, a "quintessential governmental body . . .. "2 3This body becomes
the principal factfinder in a case charged with weighing evidence, judging credi-
bility of witnesses and ultimately deciding upon a verdict.2"4 Thus, the members of
the jury become government officials, at least temporarily.20 5 "If a government
confers on a private body the power to choose the government's employees or offi-
cials, the private body will be bound by the constitutional mandate of race-neu-
trality.
208
The Court rejected Edmonson's reliance on Polk County v. Dodson217 where a
public defender was held not to be a state actor in the general representation of a
criminal defendant. 208 "Just as a government employee was deemed a private actor
because of his purpose and functions in Dodson, so here a private entity becomes a
government actor for the limited purpose of using peremptories during jury selec-
tion. "209
The dissent attacked the traditional governmental function element of the state
actor test by arguing that the exercise of peremptory challenges is a purely private
choice. 210 Citing the history of the challenge as being of "ancient origin"211 and
198. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2090 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
199. Id.
200. Id. According to Justice O'Connor, mere acquiescence by the judge is not sufficient to warrant attributing
discriminatory action to the state. Id.
201. See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
202. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2085. Citing Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), the Court explained the idea
of traditional governmental function. Id. at 2085. In Terry, the Court held that the Jaybird Democratic Associa-
tion was performing a traditional governmental function by operating the Democratic primary elections. Id. at
2085 (citing Terry, 345 U.S. at 481). The Court then struck down the procedure used by the Association to con-
duct whites-only elections to select the primary candidates. Id. (citing Terry, 345 U.S. at 481).
203. Id. Thus, even though the motive for exercising a peremptory strike is purely private, the ultimate objec-
tive for using the challenge "is to determine representation on a governmental body." Id. at 2086.
204. Id. at 2085.
205. Id.
206. Id. (citing cases).
207. 454 U.S. 312 (1981). See supra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
208. Edmnonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2086 (citing Polk County, 454 U.S. at 325).
209. Id. at 2086. "The selection of the jurors represents a unique governmental function delegated to private
litigants by the government and attributable to the government for purposes of invoking constitutional protections
against discrimination by reason of race." Id.
210. Edinonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2092-93 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 2092.
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"part of our common law heritage,"212 Justice O'Connor reasoned that "[tihe gov-
ernment otherwise establishes its requirements forjury service, leaving to the pri-
vate litigant the unfettered discretion to use the strike for any reason."213
Furthermore, in order for private conduct to become state action, the conduct
must be not only a traditional government function, but also a function that only
the government traditionally performs. 214 According to the dissent, the function of
government has never been exclusively to select juries; the government requires
the aid of the parties to select ajury by exercising peremptory challenges and chal-
lenges for cause.21
The final element of the state actor test is whether the injury is aggravated by
the "incidents of governmental authority."216 According to the majority, the dis-
crimination becomes more severe "because the government permits it to occur
within the courthouse itself."217 If race discrimination is allowed in the courtroom,
the fairness of the proceedings is seriously called into question.218 "Racial bias
mars the integrity of the judicial system and prevents the idea of democratic gov-
ernment from becoming a reality."1 9
The dissent characterized racism as "irrational, destructive, and mean."220
Even so, the dissent argued, the mere fact that racism occurs in a courtroom does
not merit holding the government responsible for the discrimination.221
The majority222 finally considered whether a litigant may raise a claim on be-
half of the person or persons discriminatorily excluded from serving on thejury.22s
[A] litigant may raise a claim on behalf of a third party if the litigant can demonstrate
that he or she has suffered a concrete, redressable injury, that he or she has a close
relation with the third party, and that there exists some hindrance to the third party's
ability to protect his or her own interests.224
212. Id.
213. Id. at 2092. The majority and dissent have differing views concerning how to frame the issue in the case.
Justice Kennedy, for the majority, focuses on the role of the jury. See supra notes 194-99 and accompanying text.
Justice O'Connor, on the other hand, focuses on the litigant's role in selecting the jury. See Edmonson, III S. Ct.
at 2090-92 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 2093. See also supra note 202.
215. Id. "The exercise of a peremptory challenge is not an important government function; it is not a govern-
ment function at all." Id. In fact, according to Justice O'Connor, the only tradition involved in the use of a pe-
remptory challenge is "one of unguided private choice." Id.
216. Edmonson, I II S. Ct. at 2083. See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
217. Id. at 2087.
218. Id.
219. Id. (citing Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940)).
220. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2095 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
221. Id.
222. The dissent failed to address whether a private litigant has standing to raise the excluded juror's rights on
that person's behalf.
223. Edmonson, I llS. Ct. at 2087.
224. Id.
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Relying on Powers,22 the Court held that these three requirements were satisfied
in the civil context.226
In a separate dissent, Justice Scalia characterized the majority's decision as "a
net loss to the minority litigant."227 He reasoned that the majority's decision would
logically apply to criminal cases -thus preventing minority criminal defendants
from seeking to prevent all-white juries and trying to seat as many jurors of the
defendant's race as possible.228 Justice Scalia also viewed the majority opinion as
adding "yet another complexity ...to an increasingly Byzantine system of jus-
tice that devotes more and more of its energy to sideshows and less and less to the
merits of the case."
229
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Current State Action Tests Are Inadequate
In Lugar,230 the Court appeared to apply a different test 231 for finding state
action than the previous tests developed in earlier cases.232 The Court noted, how-
ever, the narrow scope of its holding: "The holding today ...is limited to the
particular context of prejudgment attachment." 233 The Edmonson Court ignored
this limitation and transported the Lugar test from a due process challenge regard-
ing prejudgment attachment of a debtor's property to an equal protection challenge
concerning racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges. Rather
than applying the due process test for state action formulated in Lugar,234 however,
the Court should have recognized that an equal protection analysis requires an al-
together different inquiry. The method of analysis applied by the Court necessarily
transforms a private litigant into a state actor in order to satisfy the intent require-
ment in an equal protection challenge.
The first element of the state action test enunciated in Lugar is "whether the
claimed deprivation has resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its
225. See supra notes 57-71 and accompanying text.
226. Edmonson, I llS. Ct. at 2087. Powers held that the three requirements for third party standing were satis-
fied in the criminal context. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1371 (1991). See supra notes 64-67 and accompa-
nying text.
227. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2095 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
228. Id. "Both sides have peremptory challenges, and they are sometimes used to assure rather than toprevent a
racially diverse jury." Id.
229. Id. at 2096.
230. See supra notes 168-76 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 168.
232. See supra notes 100-19 and accompanying text. See also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,939
(1982), for a listing of the various tests used by the Court: (1) the "public function" test (citing Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)); (2) the "state compulsion" test (citing Adickes
v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970)); (3) the "nexus" test (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961)); and (4) the "joint action"
test (citing Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978)).
233. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939 n.21.
234. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982). See also supra notes 168-76 and 183-85 and ac-
companying text.
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source in state authority."235 This element of the test is generally satisfied for all
persons, every waking moment. When driving to work or school, all citizens are
required to obey certain rules. Driving a car requires state approval; even owning
a car demands the approval of the state. The right to own a home is governed by
state law. Some local laws even forbid citizens from drinking alcohol in the privacy
of their own homes. State or local laws govern almost every aspect of human life.
Thus, the first element of the test becomes largely irrelevant in the state action in-
quiry.
The second part of the state action test is whether a private party charged with
depriving another of some constitutional right can be "described in all fairness as a
state actor."236 This state actor inquiry should be irrelevant in a due process analy-
sis. A claim of denial of due process is an attack on the procedure employed, for
example, to take away a person's property; the identity of the actor who employs
this statutory procedure should be irrelevant. The relevant question in a due proc-
ess context is whether the particular law enables a deprivation of "life, liberty, or
property" without prior notice and an opportunity to be heard. 37 It is the proce-
dure within the law which is in question, not the person who executes that proce-
dure.
The Supreme Court has failed to understand this key distinction as the Flagg
Brothers238 decision unfortunately illustrates. The Court focused on the fact that a
private company acted to deprive a debtor of property. 23 The Court characterized
the statute- enabling a private party to enforce a lien by selling the debtor's prop-
erty - as a decision by the State not to act in this area merely "embodied ...in
statutory form. 24" Thus, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, focused "not
on the governmental rules implicated by the particular right asserted by Ms.
Brooks, but on whether public or private actors were responsible for her injury."241
By distinguishing the Sniadach242 line of cases as not reserving
enough control over the use of coercive force, it [was] perverse for the Court to con-
clude that the scheme in Flagg Brothers was less constitutionally infirm because the
state withdrew even its clerical rubber stamp and freed creditors to dispose of
debtors' property without any mediation or intervention by public authorities.243
235. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
236. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., I IIS. Ct. 2077, 2083 (1991) (citing Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941-42).
See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
237. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
238. See supra notes 156-66 and accompanying text.
239. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 164.
240. Id. at 165. As the dissent in Flagg Brothers cogently points out, "the focus is not on the private deprivation
but on the state authorization .. . .The State's conduct in this case takes the concrete form of a statutory enact-
ment, and it is that statute that may be challenged." Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 176 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
241. TRIBE, supra note 99, § 18-6, at 1712.
242. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
243. TRIBE, supra note 99, § 18-6, at 1713 (citing Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 174-75 (Stevens, J. joined by White
and Marshall, JJ., dissenting)). See also Strickland, supra note 163.
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Thus, the Court seems intent on finding no state action unless it can find a state
actor upon which to affix the responsibility for the injury.
The Court in Edmonson sought to apply traditional state action analysis in an
area where a state actor could not be found, except for the judge who advised pro-
spective jurors of their dismissal from service. 2" Doubtless, the Court felt com-
pelled to find a state actor because of precedents such as Flagg Brothers245 and
Lugar. 2" The problem, however, is that intentional racial discrimination is the key
to an equal protection claim, and no state actor purposefully took any action be-
cause of someone's race.
The Edionson Court should have relied on existing state action doctrine in the
equal protection area; the "joint action" test247 from Burton, for instance, is far
more suited to the case at hand. 2" By relying on such a test, no actual "state actor"
must be found. The requirement is whether the particular facts of the case indicate
that "[tihe State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with
[the alleged violator] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the chal-
lenged activity .... "249 It would hardly be far-reaching to consider the state as
a "joint participant" in the jury selection process. Contrary to Justice O'Connor's
dissent in Edmonson,25" under Burton, the entire process - rather than the isolated,
discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge- must be studied to determine the
level of State involvement. Justice Kennedy realized the importance of considering
the State's involvement in the entire process of jury selection,2"' yet insisted upon
finding that the private litigant was a state actor. In the elusive area of state action,
the Court should distinguish the equal protection cases from the due process
cases, possibly developing separate tests for each. The singular application of ex-
isting state action doctrine to due process and equal protection claims alike creates
state action decisions which are virtually impossible to reconcile with one an-
other. 252
Racial discrimination in the jury selection process has never been tolerated by
the Court.2"3 Such discrimination should not now be acceptable simply because a
private litigant is doing the discriminating. While such discrimination may be dif-
ficult to prove in many cases, the inquiry should involve consideration of some-
thing that the Court has yet to consider a violation of equal protection rights -
244. 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2084. See also id. at 2090-91 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) and supra notes 198-200 and
accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 158-66 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 168-76 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
248. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715,725-26 (1961).
249. Burton, 365 U.S. at 725.
250. See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
252. Compare Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) with Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149
(1978) and Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) with Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365
U.S. 715 (1961).
253. See Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1366 (1991); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,99 (1986); Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303,308 (1880).
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disparate impact. Stringent requirements of intent have been repudiated by some:
"[T]he denial of something to which a person has a substantive constitutional right
is no less illegal just because it may have been unintentional."2 4
Allowing disparate impact to play a part in determining when discrimination
has occurred is consistent with several state action opinions by the Court. In Bur-
ton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,255 the Court found that the government facili-
tated private discrimination because of the significant financial involvement
between the private actor and the State.25 6 In Shelley v. Kraemer,25 7 admittedly the
high water mark in discrimination cases, the Court held that using the power of
state courts to perpetuate private discrimination constituted state action.
258 Simi-
larly, the person harboring racial animus in the jury selection process is a private
person. The government, however, facilitates this action by allowing discrimina-
tory use of peremptory challenges in the courtroom. In all of these cases, the gov-
ernment has no specific intent to discriminate; yet, the challenged actions have a
disparate impact on minorities because of the discriminatory intent of the private
person.
Since the Court's decision in Washington v. Davis,259 however, a current equal
protection challenge requires "that facially race-neutral governmental action
• ..be strictly scrutinized only if it is discriminatory in both impact and purpose
.... "260At present, disparate impact may be considered only as a factor in the
determination of whether a peremptory challenge has been used in a discrimina-
tory manner:
If a prosecutor articulates a basis for a peremptory challenge that results in the dis-
proportionate exclusion of members of a certain race, the trial judge may consider
that fact as evidence that the prosecutor's stated reason constitutes a pretext for racial
discrimination .261
Such a requirement places a great burden on the person seeking to prove discrimi-
natory intent.
A better approach would be to require the party exercising peremptory chal-
lenges, in a manner which excludes a disproportionate number of minorities, to
bear the burden of proving no discriminatory intent in the use of the challenges.
For example, if a party uses a peremptory challenge to exclude a young, black, un-
employed female 262 from service, then that party would also be expected to excuse
254. TRIBE, supra note 99, § 16-20, at 1507.
255. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
256. Id. at 725. See also supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
257. 334 U.S. I (1948).
258. td. at 18.
259. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
260. TRIBE, supra note 99, § 16-20, at 1502.
261. Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1868 (1991).
262. See United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257, 1262 (7th Cir. 1991) (declining to extend the protection of
Batson to gender discrimination because the defendant did not claim that the prosecutor discriminated against all
women, but only black women, so the inquiry was limited to racial discrimination).
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others who are young and unemployed. If whites having the same characteristics
were allowed to remain on the panel, then a prima facie case of discrimination
would exist.263
B. Will Edmonson End Discrimination In the Courtroom?
The Court's decision in Edmonson should eliminate the most blatant forms of
discrimination by heretofore uncaring attorneys. Attorneys must be ready to give a
race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge. The remaining ques-
tion is to what level must a race-neutral reason rise in order to be valid.
Hernandez v. New York"- provides some guidance. In Hernandez, the prosecu-
tor exercised peremptory challenges to strike two Latinos from the venire.2"' The
reason upheld by the Court as sufficiently race-neutral was that the Latinos would
be unable to listen and follow the interpreter in the trial.266 While, such a reason
seems implicitly based on ethnicity,2 67 the Court found that the prosecutor had no
discriminatory reason to exclude these jurors because the complainants and most
of the witnesses in the case were also Latino.28
Thus, some discrimination may be inevitable, especially when an attorney
strikes only two blacks from a total of four from the venire and articulates race-
neutral reasons for removing these minorities. After all, if the reason for the chal-
lenges is solely based on race, would not the attorney have also removed the
remaining blacks from the panel? This type of circular reasoning was employed
successfully by the prosecutor in Hernandez.269 The prosecutor claimed that he
was striking the jurors because of their inability to understand and follow an inter-
preter, rather than because they were Latino.270 This reasoning is circular because
the potential jurors would be perfectly able to understand an interpreter if not for
their Latino background.
Lower courts faced with objections to the exercise of peremptory challenges
should require truly race-neutral explanations, not merely denials of racial animus
by the party in question. The Court in Hernandez supported the proposition that
263. See, e.g., Moore v. Keller Indus., Inc., 948 F2d 199, 202 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that because multiple
reasons led defendant's counsel to strike two blacks from the panel of jurors, "the existence of other jurors with
some of their individual characteristics does not demonstrate that the reasons assigned were pretextual"); State v.
Everett, 472 N.W.2d 864, 869 (Minn. 1991) (upholding prosecutor's use of peremptory challenge to strike a
young, black woman from the panel because the prosecutor also struck two white jurors under the age of 25);
Wiese v. State, 811 S.W.2d 958, 960 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (The case was remanded for a new trial because the
prosecutor struck five blacks from the venire in a discriminatory manner. The State failed to strike whites who
responded to a question with the same answer as the stricken blacks. The State also questioned blacks more rigor-
ously than whites.).
264. 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991). See supra notes 72-86 and accompanying text.
265. Id. at 1864.
266. Id.
267. "It may well be, for certain ethnic groups and in some communities, that proficiency in a particular lan-
guage, like skin color, should be treated as a surrogate for race under an equal protection analysis." Id. at 1872-
73.
268. Id. at 1864.
269. Id. See supra notes 72-86 and accompanying text.
270. Id. at 1864.
[Vol. 13:261
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES IN CIVIL CASES
disproportionate impact on a given race, caused by the use of peremptory chal-
lenges, may be evidence that alleged race-neutral reasons "constitute[] a pretext
for racial discrimination. 27 1 Such evidence should be given more credence by the
courts than it has been given in the past.272
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court reached the correct verdict in Edmonson. The citizens of a
given locale, who care enough about the condition of the country to register to
vote, should not be subjected to discrimination by anyone involved when sum-
moned for jury service.
Granted, even a dog can tell the difference between being kicked and being tripped
over. But if one is first dragged toward the boot and then stumbled over often
enough, the pains and bruises become indistinguishable from those inflicted by kick-
ing: the effect is the same, no matter how understanding the victim tries to be.273
Exercising peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner harms the
diginity of the excluded juror. Such behavior should not be tolerated in a court-
room.
271. Id. at 1868.
272. See Hernandez, Ill S. Ct. 1859, 1873 (1991); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,242 (1976).
273. TRiBE, supra note 99, § 16-21, at 1519.
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